EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
seems an accident, for instance, that Einstein's encounter in 1910 with Nernst, a powerful organizer of scientific institutions and one of the leading representatives of physical chemistry in Germany, constitutes a turning point not only in Einstein's career but to some extent also in the history of theoretical physics. It was in fact a striking and consequential success for both men to find such a close agreement between Einstein's quantum theory of specific heats and the measurements performed in Nernst's laboratory. Is it possible that, more than anything else, it was the match between the early quantum theory and the powerful movement of physical chemistry that shaped Einstein's career in these years?
Nernst's responsibility not only for Einstein's being invited to the First Solvay Congress of 1911 but also for his being called to the prestigious position as van't Hoff s successor at the Prussian Academy in Berlin three years later can be taken as evidence in point. Only to Nernst, it seems, could Einstein have appeared as a "Boltzmann redivivus," whose boldness in theory and intimate contact with experiment Nernst not only admired but probably also felt to be close to his own way of thinking (see the letter to Schuster quoted in Diane Barkan's paper on the First Solvay Congress). Einstein was, after all, not only self-educated in physical chemistry, but his deep fascination with that discipline brought him even as a student into a critical distance from Boltzmann, whom he followed more in the manner of Nernst than as a faithful disciple of mathematical physics (see the discussion of Einstein's early reception of the "masters" of classical physics in the paper by Jtirgen Renn in this volume).
The role of the institutional context of Einstein's intellectual development, on the other hand, is the subject of the paper by Thomas Hughes. He continues the study of the technical culture to which Einstein was exposed since childhood, a study to which pioneering contributions have been made by Pyenson (1985) and Stachel (Einstein 1987) . Referring to the discussions by Holton of visual thinking in Einstein's research, Hughes reevaluates the intellectual merits of patent work. The cognitive problem at issue is how a mental model of a technical device is created on the basis of its representation on paper (e.g., a patent application). This question is a key subject of recent studies in the cognitive sciences (see for example the book by Gentner and Stevens [1983] ). From these studies it appears that essentially the same cognitive processes are at work whether creating such mental models for technical devices or for scientific theories. From a theoretical perspective, then, the gulf between Einstein's scientific research and his work as a patent clerk is not that wide. To make these theoretical considerations fruitful for the history of science, however, mental models have to be conceived of as being themselves subject both to developments within an individual biography and to historical changes. For instance, there is no chance of plausibly reconstructing the cognitive models built up by Einstein in the course of his analysis of patent applications without taking into account his prior knowledge of contemporary electrotechnology and electrodynamics. I shall return later to the necessity for a diachronic reconstruction of Einstein's knowledge.
Hughes' discussion of Einstein's later involvement in inventions and patent lawsuits not only reveals an interest in technical questions throughout Einstein's life. It also highlights Einstein's hitherto underestimated sense for practical and financial matters, which at times may even have been in potential conflict with his humanistic ideals, as is illustrated by Einstein's involvement with a patent suit -in the middle of World War I -concerning a gyrocompass of potential interest to the German navy. How far Einstein was from being an anima Candida is stressed also by Schulmann; but it is perhaps most evident in Einstein's admiration for his one colleague and friend, the father figure whom he considered to be just that: Hendrik Antoon Lorentz. Einstein's relationship with Lorentz began as that of a student reading the works of a master, was continued by a very intensive epistolary exchange initiated by Einstein in 1909, and quickly turned into a warm friendship after their first encounter in 1911. A. J. Kox's account of this relationship makes it once again clear, after Stern's study of Einstein and Haber (Stern 1988) , that the literary form of a double portrait can be a powerful tool for creating context and historical perspective.
To analyze the relationship between Einstein and Lorentz, Kox introduces the notion of "distance" -understood in both a cultural and a geographical sensewhich helps to describe the ambivalence in their relationship, in particular Einstein's refusal, on more than one occasion, to accept a position in the Netherlands. But the concept of an ambivalent distance may also be used to pinpoint another intersection of institutional and intellectual contexts in Einstein. He was indeed, from an institutional point of view, at a considerable distance from the establishment of contemporary physics -first during his studies at the Swiss Polytechnical High School and then as an employee at the patent office. But intellectually and -by way of correspondence with scientists such as Lorentz, Boltzmann, Wien, and Planck -also personally, he was much closer to the establishment than had been assumed before the systematic assessment of archival materials in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein. This combination of proximity to and distance from the masters of his invisible college may have given Einstein the liberty to formulate unorthodox interpretations of the works of these masters, a liberty he may not have enjoyed as one of their immediate disciples (see the introduction to Renn and Schulmann 1992) .
This consideration, however, does not explain one of the most striking conclusions of Kox's study, the difference between Einstein's perceptions of Lorentz and of Planck. Einstein's scientific discussions with the two were not at all so diverse as to justify the different tone in which he spoke of these exchanges. Apparently, it was Einstein's identification with Lorentz as an ideal alter ego that motivated his admiration from a distance. What exactly were the conflicts in Einstein's mind that seemed to be resolved in Lorentz' harmonious personality, but in a way that was out of reach for Einstein? Was the attraction (and repulsion) merely a matter of personality? Or did Lorentz also embody an intellectual idealagain, attractive to Einstein but unattainable -that of classical physics? Their later collaboration on general relativity, in many ways a "love child" of classical physics (see its interpretation by McCormmach [1970] as a continuation of the scientific ideals of the electromagnetic world view), argues for the latter alternative. But further insights into this matter might also result from comparing the reactions by Lorentz and Planck to Einstein, to assess the way in which the two masters of classical physics "digested" Einstein's conceptual revolutions, achieved by reinterpreting their prior accomplishments. In any case, the contributions of Hughes and Kox make it particularly evident that a more systematic exploration is needed of what one might call the cultural psychology of science.
Problems of the acceptance, the tradition, and the refusal of scientific ideas would be central to such a pursuit. In the present volume they are the focus of the second section, "The Context of Reception." Study of the reception of Einstein's science is by now a well-developed field of research, with contributions ranging from the pioneering work of Glick (1987) to the studies of Hentschel (1990) , Sanchez-Ron (in Glick 1987) , and Warwick (1990) . The papers presented here throw light on the reception of two "concepts in flux," to use an expression by Elkana, the light quantum (Barkan) and the gravitational singularity (Eisenstaedt).
Most participants in the First Solvay Congress -with the remarkable exception of Einstein -attempted to bar the contradictions within classical physics triggered by the early work on the quantum hypothesis from entering the realm of microphysics, thus erecting a "monster barrier" (Lakatos) against the threat represented by these contradictions. Similarly, the singularity of the Schwarzschild solution of Einstein's gravitational field equations was itself considered to be such a "monster barrier," as is made strikingly clear by its colorful designation as a "magic circle" by Eddington.
Nevertheless, the fates of these ideas turned out to be very different: a relatively rapid experimental and theoretical stabilization in the case of the light quantum, and a very hesitant acceptance of the physical significance of the singularityuntil its admission under the title "black hole" -into the realm of physical realities. The studies by Barkan and Eisenstaedt provide hints indicating that this diversity may have been largely a function of the centrality or marginality of the disciplines that formed the social fabric within which these ideas matured. The expansion of research on quantum problems following the first Solvay conference in fact accumulated a flood of evidence for the untenability of classical physics, a flood that even a monster barrier could not resist. The monster barrier surrounding the problem of the gravitational singularity, on the other hand, remained virtually intact during what Eisenstaedt has called the "low watermark" period of general relativity, in which it remained a relatively inactive field at the margins of modern physics.
That the social and cultural mechanisms for establishing new ideas as part of common knowledge both within and outside science were defied by the conceptual revolution in physics at the beginning of this century is an insight suggested by all three contributions assembled in this section. It follows from Barkan's paper, for instance, that the First Solvay Congress may be seen -at least from the perspective of its principal initiator, Nernst -as the creation of a "theoretical laboratory" in an attempt to transfer the model of cooperation in an experimental laboratory to the discussion of theoretical problems. (This model character of physical chemistry for the new theoretical physics was discussed in more general terms by Baracca et al. 1979.) In contrast to the attitude of the physical chemist Nernst, classical physicists such as Lorentz rather expected that, while the participants in the congress were still debating, some lonely thinker in some distant corner of the world might already have found the solution to the quantum riddle.
Einstein's sarcastic remarks on the "lamentation over the ruins of Jerusalem" that he had to listen to at the "witches' Sabbath" of Brussels give the impression that his sympathies were rather with Lorentz. But his attitude was in fact ambiguous: while he attempted, in relative isolation, to find a theoretical solution to the quantum problems by modifying and extending Lorentz'electron theory, he also pursued -much in the pragmatic manner of physical chemists such as Nernst -the immediate theoretical and experimental consequences of the quantum hypothesis, this time in close interdependence with a variety of other scientists, from Haber and Nernst to Rubens and Warburg.
The paper by Eisenstaedt summarizes the contorted way in which the modern history of the problem of gravitation and light made contact with its classical precursor, the Newtonian theory of the action of gravitation on light. One of the odd points of contact was the excavation of a historical paper on the Newtonian theory of light deflection by Lenard, in the context of a politically motivated polemic against Einstein. One can read this event not only as yet another piece of evidence for the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism as a more or less latent theme in virtually all discussions surrounding Einstein in Germany (see in particular Sommerfeld's remarks on Einstein's "abstract-Semitic" theory of relativity in a letter to Lorentz quoted by Barkan). But more generally, one should also interpret the almost complete oblivion of the Newtonian theory as an indication of the problematic relationship of science to its own history. While forgetfulness is a necessary companion of progress, the history of the corpuscular theory of light illustrates that, at least occasionally, reflection on history might provide useful resources even to a working scientist. But as long as the "image of science" (Elkana) as being characterized by an autonomous and linear progress prevails, the difficulty that scientists experience in reflecting on the history of their own subject, let alone in facing the challenge of the political instrumentalization of both science and its history, will remain. In fact, as Hubert Goenner shows in his contribution on the anti-Semitic campaign against Einstein in 1920, at least some of the scientists involved in this campaign considered their participation to be an apolitical if not "antipolitical" defense of pure science.
A closer look at the rich material Goenner expounds reveals that not only a certain image of science but also the changed social structures of knowledge contributed to making the scientific community vulnerable to political and available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700001277 ideological infiltration. Goenner points to the peculiar alliance supporting antirelativistic propaganda in both public and scientific discussions, an alliance in which scientists who could not count or no longer counted as part of the avantgarde, associated themselves with right-wing political entrepreneurs. It appears that the polemical attacks against the theory of relativity would probably not have penetrated discussions within the scientific community to the same extent had they not resonated with the fragmentation of that community itself, which had created the conditions for a split between the avant-garde and those not participating in the great intellectual revolutions of the time. It seems that this fragmentation was less the result of the introduction of new concepts intellectually inaccessible to the majority of physicists than of the increased specialization of the field. The introduction of revolutionary ideas made it only strikingly clear that in fact the majority of physicists were no longer concerned with foundational issues, and that a clash had occurred between their "image of science" and developments in the body of knowledge. Extended studies of science in Nazi Germany such as those by Mehrtens (1990) , but also studies in the history of art of this period have already paved the way for following up the theoretical questions raised by Goenner's account.
The impact of Einstein's ideas on various aspects of culture, often perceived as a radical challenge of traditional conceptions, forms a remarkable contrast to the gradual spreading of relativistic concepts into other areas of science. The latter process is the main topic of the third section, "The Experimental Context," which presents two very detailed and highly technical studies, one by Klaus Hentschel on gravitational redshift and the other by Roger Stuewer on mass-energy equivalence. These papers show that some of the experimental consequences of the general and special theories of relativity were successfully pursued in the context of research programs to which these theories were by no means central -the study of the solar spectrum in the 1920s and the attempts to establish the structure of the atomic nucleus in the early 1930s.
In particular, the studies by Hentschel and Stuewer illuminate how concepts pertaining to the theories of relativity became part of these research programs by first being marginally involved in the context of specific applications but finally emerging as central clues for explaining the experimental evidence. Both papers make use of the metaphor of an evolving network consisting of hypotheses, experimental evidence, and arguments to describe this process of gradual integration of new ideas, accompanied by shifts of emphasis, leading eventually to the consolidation of these ideas. That this consolidation was not an isolated act but rather a systemic property of these extended networks of experimental and theoretical knowledge is a crucial insight supported by these case studies.
The last section, "The Philosophical Context," takes us back to the complex network of ideas in Einstein's thinking. As it turns out, however, the network metaphor as it is discussed by Hentschel in an attempt to defend the rationality of a scientific "conversion" may have to be extended to the philosophical realm in order to do justice to the aspects of scientific thinking that are at issue here. All five papers in this section contribute to bringing into focus what John Stachel has so succinctly called "the other Einstein." They throw light on those aspects of Einstein's thinking that have been left in the shadow of his successful contributions, and in particular onto some of his more general, often implicit, and sometimes even apparently incoherent ideas. These ideas have in general not found expression in a technically elaborate form, and it would be difficult to cast them into the metaphor of a network that principally consists of hypotheses and logically concise scientific arguments.
Mara Beller reexamines the debates between Einstein and Bohr on the foundations of quantum mechanics, in the context of Bohr's creation of the concept of complementarity. While Einstein has been consistently portrayed as an honorable loser in these debates, Beller raises again the fundamental question of what makes one scientific argument more convincing than an alternative one, and she shows the extent to which a decision depends on prior conceptual commitments. Beller analyzes the role of Bohr's rhetoric regarding the "inevitability" of the Copenhagen interpretation and argues that the persuasive force of this rhetoric depends on two factors that may be of general relevance to an understanding of the conceptual structures of science: (1) the fact that the selfconsistency and circularity of Bohr's arguments made the concepts used in these arguments ultimately appear to be self-evident; and (2) the fact that Bohr succeeded in linking technical arguments to more general issues -for instance, regarding the nature of measurement and of language -thus stabilizing his technical arguments by integrating them into an extended conceptual framework. Arthur Fine's paper illustrates that Einstein's conceptual commitments regarding quantum mechanics were indeed less stable than those of Bohr and confronts us with a previously unnoticed multiplicity of Einstein's interpretations of quantum mechanics. Fine suggests that if we place Einstein's critique of quantum mechanics in the context of his attempts to encourage alternative approaches, we are able to understand the diversity and flexibility in his interpretations. How wide-ranging Einstein's alternative approaches to the main roads of physics were, including those he had paved himself, is made forcefully clear in Stachel's paper. While it is often claimed that Einstein's most fundamental physical intuitions were determined by the polar concepts of atom and field, Stachel points out that Einstein throughout his life had also considered alternatives to this polarity, in particular a purely algebraic physics. Stachel identifies some of the possible sources for these ideas in Einstein's early philosophical readings in the context of the Olympia Academy. By inventing "the other Einstein," debating throughout his lifetime with his better-known counterpart, Stachel creates an ingenious literary substitute for the dialogue form in which scientists of a much earlier age unfolded their conceptual vacillations.
Yemima Ben-Menahem's broadly conceived study of Einstein's concept of causality presents further evidence that Einstein was not only unorthodox but also flexible and pragmatic in his reflections on science. She identifies various concepts available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700001277 of causality at work in Einstein's thinking that are not integrated by a systematic philosophical analysis. Her paper rather hints, as do the other three contributions to this section, at a complex interplay between philosophical concepts and technical arguments that takes place within the local contexts of scientific arguments. Further insights into this interplay will have to rely not only on studies of Einstein's philosophical sources, in continuation of those by Holton, Fine, Howard, Beller, and others, but also on detailed diachronic studies of the interaction between general concepts and the specific problems in which they were relevant for Einstein's thinking.
For instance, one might trace what Ben-Menahem calls Einstein's "romantic" concept of causality, suggesting a universal interdependence of natural forces, to his early reading of popular scientific literature, which indeed did carry ideas of Romantic natural philosophy into the late nineteenth century, in spite of the polemical distance from it (see Frederick Gregory's 1977 work on scientific materialism). This odd vehicle may even have served to transmit to Einstein some of the older ideas on gravitation and light, as mentioned by Eisenstaedt. It would, however, be misleading to lay too much emphasis on isolated parallels between a single source and an aspect of Einstein's thinking, because such analogies have of course no demonstrative power.
Hence it would, in this particular example, be crucial first to reconstruct the conceptual structures holding together the worldview of the popular scientific literature encountered by Einstein. Tentatively assuming that these conceptual structures shaped his early understanding of science, one can then attempt to assess their impact on his theories (for instance, on his exploration of a possible relationship between molecular forces and gravitation). The paper by Jiirgen Renn presents -in broad outline -such a reconstruction of the development of some of Einstein's thought structures from his earliest encounter with scientific literature to his revolutionary achievements of 1905. On the basis of recently discovered material, he reconstructs Einstein's acquisition of scientific knowledge not as "collecting of pieces of information" but as building up complex conceptual structures in the context of solving specific problems. Renn suggests an interpretation of Einstein's conceptual break with classical physics which makes two claims usually considered incompatible: that there indeed is a strict conceptual break between classical and modern physics, and yet that Einstein's breakthrough can be understood as the result of a continuous and rational conceptual development. His comparison of Einstein's case with a structurally analogous development, the emergence of classical mechanics in the works of Galileo and his disciples, hints at general patterns of conceptual development in science which seem to be at work here.
Taken together, the papers of this last section suggest that Einstein's philosophical and scientific thinking has deeper roots in various intellectual traditions than its either fragmentary (in the case of philosophy) or revolutionary (in the case of physics) appearance would suggest. The inclusion of the historical paper by Carl Gottfried Neumann in this volume, published for the first time in English translation (by Gideon Freudenthal), together with an introductory essay by Robert DiSalle, is intended to illustrate the historical continuity of some of the problems studied by Einstein. Neumann's analysis of the principles of classical mechanics is just one example of various discussions of the foundations of physics in the nineteenth century that seem, as DiSalle puts it, almost "clairvoyant" if considered in retrospect from the point of view of the special and general theories of relativity. What are the reasons behind this impression? The paper by Neumann shares with Einstein's 1905 paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies a common feature that is often overlooked: it represents a reexamination of mechanics against the background of the establishment of nonmechanical theories, especially theories of electricity and magnetism, as a substantial part of classical physics.
For Neumann, who was himself an important contributor to the continental tradition of theories of electricity, this meant in particular that the basic concepts of mechanics could no longer be accepted as self-evident but required an analysis of their explanatory function in the light of the entire body of knowledge they were supposed to sustain. This revision alone of the status of the fundamental concepts of mechanics has helped prepare the conditions for a change of these concepts should such a change become necessary in view of the growing body of knowledge; Neumann himself admitted such a possibility in his paper. His philosophical critique of Helmholtz' reductionism in On the Conservation of Force, motivated by Neumann's own use of more general, velocity-dependent forces in his theory of electrodynamics, prefigures Einstein's distinction between constructive theories and theories of principles.
But Neumann also made further, more direct contributions to the conceptual transformation of mechanics. By introducing the "Body Alpha" as the material embodiment of an absolute reference frame he came close to denying, in effect, one of the fundamental tenets of Newton's theory of absolute space. This is illustrated by his assertion that without introducing the Body Alpha, a single sphere rotating in an otherwise empty universe would remain spherical and not be deformed into an ellipsoid due to centrifugal forces, as it follows instead from Newton's theory (see Freudenthal's analysis of the conceptual foundations of Newton's mechanics and also Ben-Menahem's comments on Einstein's discussion of a related example). Making the reality of absolute motion dependent on such a nonentity (Unding) as the Body Alpha, transformed the concept of absolute motion from a self-evident supposition into a dubious construct. Neumann himself points to the analogy of his Body Alpha with the luminiferous ether, which must, but as it later turned out cannot exist, because of the mutually incompatible requirements imposed on it. Moreover, at the fringes of Neumann's conceptual study of classical mechanics, later extended by Mach and others, the contours of a relativistic mechanics become visible -albeit, for the time being, ex negativo. The extent to which a relativistic analysis within the framework of classical mechanics has been actually available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889700001277 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 25 Jan 2019 at 16:49:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, performed becomes evident, however, from a paper written in 1905 by the Viennese physicist Hoffmann, later acknowledged by Einstein as a precursor of aspects of general relativity (see Renn and Richards, in preparation) .
In summary, it is only natural that the image of Einstein emerging from a volume dedicated to exploring his contexts is more fragmentary than the picture to which we have been accustomed. This fact, however, raises a methodological problem for the history of science: To the extent that the papers here collected suggest that Einstein was not an isolated actor on the historical scene, it becomes desirable that those structures, both cognitive and social, that appear to govern the dramaturgy of the play should themselves be more systematically rendered the object of historical study. Such an approach promises to yield both a less fragmentary and a less idiosyncratic account of the historical process. But if the traditional narrative forms of history were given up entirely as a tool for creating a synthesis accessible also to our intuitive understanding, such an approach would risk losing sight of the uniqueness of the intersection of various contexts in such a singular personality as Einstein. In particular, a purely "contextualist" outlook would be unable to do justice to the interconnectedness and internal coherence of Einstein's various endeavors, which has been stressed so convincingly by Holton. If the present volume succeeds in illustrating not only the risks but also the advantages of both approaches, the structuralist and the narrative, it has fulfilled part of its function.
